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Chapter 9
Narratives of Illness, Difference,
and Personhood
John P. McTighe
Abstract Narratives help us weave the tale of who we are and of how we fit (or
don’t) into the world around us. Thus, a search for meaning—an enduring “root
metaphor” for one’s identity and existence, and a way of coping with challenges to
that metaphor—is central to the narrative perspective. The question for a clinician is
not simply: “Is this client mentally ill” or “With which mental illness should the
client be diagnosed.” Rather, it is: “What is this person’s understanding of the
nature of his or her experience, and the meaning of that experience for identity and
sense of self? What does it mean, for this person, to be mentally ill? To think of
oneself, or be thought of by others, as mentally ill?” Using narrative theory, the
chapter examines how ideas and attitudes about mental disorder are shaped by
cultural values and stereotypes, and how the experience of trauma can shatter the
narrative of self and world. Placing the question of illness, differentness, and per-
sonhood within a social justice perspective, it challenges clinicians to consider how
the vocabulary of illness is used to frame experience and, in many cases, to min-
imize, marginalize, or discount the individual’s own lived experience.
Keywords Constructivist  Intentionality  Particularity  Phenomenality 
Referentiality  Root metaphor  Temporality  Trajectory
Introduction: Why This Matters
Human beings are storied creatures. As we live our lives from start to finish, within
the bounds of what both memory and interpretation will allow, we weave the tale of
who we are as persons and of how we fit (or do not) into the world around us. These
stories both emerge from and serve to craft our sense of ourselves, the world, and
ourselves in the world. The term that is commonly used for the construction of these
stories and their role in our development and identity is narrative. For those who
J.P. McTighe (&)
School of Social Work, Ramapo College of New Jersey, Mahwah, NJ 07430, USA
e-mail: jmctighe@ramapo.edu
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
B. Probst (ed.), Critical Thinking in Clinical Assessment and Diagnosis,
Essential Clinical Social Work Series, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-17774-8_9
171
suffer from what we consensually refer to (though with a good deal of subjectivity
and variation, as we shall see) as a “mental disorder,” a psychiatric diagnosis can
have a significant impact, not only on the course of treatment that is indicated but
on the very sense of self—the sense of one’s own personhood. What does it mean to
be mentally ill? To think of oneself, or be thought of by others, as mentally ill? And
how does this impact the story of who I am in the world?
In this chapter, we will consider the nature and function of narrative and the
implications of a narrative understanding of mental illness for the social and cultural
worlds in which we live. We will explore what this means for the sense of self of
persons identified by themselves or others as mentally ill. We will consider the mul-
tipleways that this termmay be used by individuals, families, institutions, and society.
As social workers are interested in justice for the clients with whom we work, it is
essential for us to be aware of the ways in which constructs like “mental illness”may
be used, not only to understand and support people who are suffering in a particular
kind of way, but also how the term “mental illness” may be used in subtle and not so
subtle ways as a weapon of oppression and marginalization (Wakefield 2013). We
need to understand that the words we use to frame our own experience or that of others
may serve to minimize, marginalize, or, in some other way, further discount the lived
experience of the persons with whom we work. We need to understand the respon-
sibility that comes with the role of diagnostician that we take on in our practice.
Guiding Questions
1. What is narrative, and what does it mean to consider the nature of lived
experience through a narrative lens?
2. Is mental illness a condition that an individual experiences? Or is it an attribute
of the person’s self—an aspect of identity?
3. What is the impact of culture (in all its many layers and manifestations) on our
understanding of mental illness, and how is the label of mental illness used in
the social environment?
4. How can a narrative understanding of the nature of mental illness, and an
openness to the ever-unfolding narrative of our clients, inform our approach as
social workers?
Background
Narrative and narrative psychology belong under the general rubric of constructivist
theory. Constructivist theory is based on the notion that what is observed is con-
ditioned upon the observer and that the development of a sense of identity and self
has both psychological and sociological dimensions (Crossley 2003; Kelley 1996).
White and Epston (1990) pioneered a particular form of narrative therapy as a
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means of helping individuals deconstruct and reconstruct the ways in which they
crafted the stories of their personal lives by selective attention to certain details
along with the subjugation of other details. This approach highlights the central role
of language and story (inherently both psychological and sociological) in the
constitution of the self in the social world (Crossley 2003).
In other words, when we tell the story of who we are or how some aspect of our
lives has unfolded, we invariably craft and interpret that story by selecting certain
details of experience that both shape and illustrate our understanding of our
experience. This selection is inevitably limited and, as we will see, is influenced by
the seemingly countless individuals and happenings that have contributed to our
sense of self.
Consider, for example, a client named Robin who tells you, her social worker,
that she began a new job a couple of weeks earlier. When you ask Robin how the
job is going, she replies that she is miserable! She goes on to say that on that day,
she was given a task to complete that was terribly complicated. She had never been
asked to do anything like that before. She found it very confusing, was rushing to
meet the deadline given to her by her boss, and felt overwhelmed to the point of
tears. In fact, she is thinking of quitting her job the next morning, or not even going
to work at all. She is certain she will never be able to handle the job. She does not
even know why they hired her in the first place. In response, you empathize with
how difficult the day was for her, of course, and how overwhelmed she is feeling.
You go on to ask Robin how she was feeling about the job prior to the frustrating
events of the day. She reports that, generally speaking, she has really liked the work
she has been doing. She has a pleasant and supportive boss and friendly coworkers.
She actually felt quite proud of herself for getting the job since it is really a step up
from her former job, both in responsibilities and salary.
When you ask her to reflect on how she has handled such challenging work
assignments in the past, particularly when the work is new to her, Robin reports that
she seems to have always found a way to get the job done. She says that she has is a
hard worker who can figure things out when she puts her mind to it. And she has
never had the experience of a boss being really unhappy with the work she has
done. She has asked questions when she needs to and has usually gotten the support
she needs to do her work. She even goes on to tell you about a seemingly
impossible task in a previous job that she was able to tackle all on her own, and how
her boss was so proud of her for what she had done. As you reflect back to her what
she has said about her overall positive experience of the job so far, and her history
of competence and success in the work place, you begin to see the expression on
her face changes. “What might all of this positive experience have to say to you
about the kind of day you had today” you ask her? Robin pauses and suggests that
maybe it was just a really bad day and that she will likely adjust to the new work
and responsibilities as she has done in the past. From a narrative perspective, we
might say something like this. In order for the client to tell herself the story that her
new job is bad, overwhelming, and beyond her abilities, she has to subjugate or
ignore all the positive experiences she has had since starting the job as well as her
history of success in the workplace. She does not do this purposefully or
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consciously, of course. The power of the unpleasant experience and story of the day
simply takes over and gets in the way of her telling a more balanced story of the
events. The narrative approach helps her to balance out the story in her mind in a
way that is richer and more adaptive while still being realistic.
Crossley (2000, 2003) states that narrative is built upon the notion that human
consciousness is constructed by the ordering of events in a meaningful way. Two
constitutive dimensions of this, he suggests, are time/temporality and relationships/
connections. That is to say, the meaning of all human events is structured by their
placement in time and over the course of time, as well as by their relationship or
connection to other events that make up the life narrative of the subject.
Some social constructivist perspectives are criticized for portraying daily, lived
experience as overly disordered, chaotic, and random. In contrast, Crossley states, the
narrative approach attends to the more orderly sense of daily existence that we
structure along the lines of meaningfulness and anticipated trajectories. To illustrate
this, Crossley uses the example of trauma and the disruption it causes to the survivor’s
sense of self and his or her expected course of experience. This is similar to the notion
that trauma shatters the assumptive world of the survivor (Janoff-Bulman 1992).
Through the experience of the rupture of trauma, or the development of a mental
illness that may change the anticipated course of our life, we realize the profound
orderliness that that we had come to expect from the narrative of our experience. But
beyond this, it is through the process of narrative and story making that we recon-
stitute a sense of meaning and order both in ourselves and in the world around us.
Sarbin (1986) introduces his work on narrative with the premise that all human
conduct is framed by the structure of a story and that such stories provide the
vehicle for the interpretation of inter- and intrapersonal interactions and inten-
tionalities. Calling upon the work of Pepper (1942), Sarbin offers the notion of the
root metaphor as a framework for understanding the function of narrative.
[Pepper] demonstrated how the root metaphor provides the framework for the construing of
occurrences in the natural and man-made worlds. The root metaphor constrains the kinds of
philosophical or scientific models to be applied either to the task of observing and clas-
sifying or to the task of interpreting and explaining. (p. 4)
In other words, the root metaphor conditions the way we think about experience
and the meaning it has in the overall narrative of our life. To this end, narrative
makes use of emplotment to organize events and the observations of experience into
coherent and relatable units of meaning. It is the way in which human beings
“impose structure on the flow of experience” (p. 9).
Narrative, Meaning Making, and the Search for Meaning
Arguably the foremost thinker of the twentieth century with respect to the role of
meaning making was Frankl (1946/1984). Based on his experience of life in a Nazi
concentration camp, Frankl’s development of logotherapy aimed to address what he
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saw as the existential importance of making meaning of suffering and adversity as a
way of accessing inner resources that could lead to survival and transformation.
Frankl writes:
We must never forget that we may also find meaning in life even when confronted with a
hopeless situation, when facing a fate that cannot be changed. For what then matters is to
bear witness to the uniquely human potential at its best, which is to transform a personal
tragedy into a triumph, to turn one’s predicament into a human achievement… In some
way, suffering ceases to be suffering at the moment it finds a meaning, such as the meaning
of sacrifice. (p. 135)
Numerous theoreticians and researchers have since added to the literature
regarding meaning making and the search for meaning in human experience, as
well as to the understanding of the human person as a meaning-making creature. As
far back as the eighteenth century, Kant (1787/1965) argued that the human person
seeks to bring order to the world based on distinct criteria that structure our
experience. This all has important ramifications for our understanding of what is
means to be diagnosed (or to diagnose someone else, for that matter) and to live
with a mental illness.
Narrative, Meaning and Trauma As in the case of Frankl (1946/1984), meaning
is commonly sought in the context of trauma, loss, and suffering. Indeed, the
psychological consequences of trauma can be conditioned by the meaning ascribed
to the event by individuals, families, and communities (Fullerton 2004). Neimeyer
(2005) notes that human beings understand loss in the context of narratives that are
thematized in such ways as to offer us a sense of the why’s of our experience.
Trauma, however, can shatter the themes by which we understand our world and
incite us to renegotiate our systems of meaning.
This notion is central to the work of Janoff-Bulman (1992, 2006) who suggests
that human beings possess a conceptual system of assumptions about the world and
the way it works. These assumptions are hierarchically organized such that our most
basic assumptions are also the most general and the least open to change. Janoff-
Bulman (1992) proposes that most people share three basic assumptions. First, the
world is benevolent. This belief may be held even in the face of contradictory
evidence because the fundamental point of reference is one’s personal experience of
the world and the people in one’s life, and most people’s experience has been
predominantly positive. Second, the world is meaningful. The notion that the world
makes sense emerges from our desire to find congruity among ourselves, other
people, and the events that happen to us. We tend to look to culturally endorsed
rules like justice and personal control, for example, to understand this. Third, the
self is worthy. Most of the time, most people perceive themselves as good, capable,
and moral, even if this requires some degree of compartmentalization or
rationalization.
Janoff-Bulman (1992) suggests that the origins of these assumptions are to be
found in the earliest periods of human development in relationship to what has been
variously conceived of as our emerging sense of basic trust (Erikson 1968), the
sufficiency of the holding environment (Winnicott 1965), the positive nature of our
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attachment to our primary caregivers (Bowlby 1969, 1973), or the organization of
our earliest perceptions and experiences into what Stern (1985) calls representations
of interactions that have been generalized (RIGS).
According the Janoff-Bulman’s (1985, 1992, 2006; Janoff-Bulman and Frantz
1997) thinking, the experience of trauma shatters the fundamental assumptions on
which we have built our sense of the world. Consequently, the process of recovery
from trauma requires a renegotiation or rebuilding of our assumptions in order to
reestablish our sense of equilibrium. This is an intuitive rather than a deliberate
process that allows us to regain our ability to perceive benevolence and meaning in
the world, as well as our own sense of self-worth.
Janoff-Bulman (1992) highlights three strategies by which traumatized indi-
viduals accomplish this. First, comparison to others allows us to focus on those
whom we perceive to be worse off than us, thereby providing us with some sense of
reassurance with respect to our own experience and position in the world. Second,
the interpretation of one’s role in the victimization (often entailing self-blame)
allows us to restore the notion that we, in fact, had some sort of control over the
situation. This, she notes, may be characterological (“There is something wrong
with me, not the world”) or behavioral (“I did something I should not have done or
misjudged the situation in some way”). Third, individuals search for some benefit
from the trauma they have endured or a sense of the purpose for which this might
have happened to them. This effort to find deeper meaning in the experience (e.g.
lessons that have been learned, a deepened sense of altruism, a validation of justice
or fairness) enables us to continue perceiving the world as a place that makes sense.
Utilizing social work’s traditional emphasis on the strengths perspective com-
bined with a narrative constructivist view, Norman (2000) encourages clinicians to
create a supportive, listening environment in which clients can begin to tell the story
of their trauma, all the while listening for and identifying signs of strength, survi-
vorship, and resilience. Whether clients have been traumatically impacted by a single
event or prolonged exposure, whether they have been traumatized in adulthood after
a history of relatively healthy psychological functioning or bear the enduring scars of
a traumatic childhood, helping them to reframe their stories in light of these positive
elements can facilitate clients’ growth and allow for the creation of useful metaphors
that can help them find meaning in past as well as future experience.
Narrative and culture The effort to make meaning of our experience extends
beyond the realm of the individual and the interpersonal into the social and cultural
worlds in which we are immersed (Neimeyer 2005). Here too, human beings seek
validation of their interpretation of experience as they express it in culturally
endorsed ways.
Bruner (1986, 1990, 1991, 2004) has been a key contributor to the understanding
of the role of narrative in organizing human experience and the recursive rela-
tionship between intentionality, action, and interpretation. In a seminal essay on
narrative, Bruner (1991) argues that narrative is a cultural product that aids in the
organization of our sense of reality. He proposes that narrative has ten features:
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• Diachronicity: the unfolding of events over time
• Particularity: the relationship of narrative to specific events
• Intentional state entailment: the influence of narrative characters’ beliefs,
desires, theories, and values
• Hermeneutic composability: the human capacity to tell and interpret stories as
stories
• Canonicity and breach: the notion that what makes a story worth telling is the
way in which it constitutes a break from that which is routinely expected
• Referentiality: the relationship between the contents of the story and its
resemblance to our consensual sense of what is possible in reality
• Genericness: the ability of a narrative to be identified with a certain genre
• Normativeness: the implication of the narrative about the way in which one
ought to behave or what one ought to do
• Context sensitivity and negotiability: the relationship between the roles of the
author or story and the reader/listener with respect to context and interpretation
of the narrative
• Narrative accrual: the notion that stories build on one another and flow from one
to the other
Bruner further develops his thought about the matrix that gives rise to narrative
in his understanding of the reflexive relationship between narrative and culture.
Beginning with the premise that life in time is necessarily cast within and described
by a narrative structure, Bruner notes that life is not only expressed in narrative
form, but that narrative comes to structure the expectations and parameters within
which life can be experienced (Bruner 2004). This is importantly and more broadly
set on the stage of culture where the relationships between individual and com-
munal narratives are shaped. Thus, Bruner suggests, culture provides us with the
canon within which our narratives are formed and so conditions the range of
meanings and possible worlds accounted for in our stories (Bruner 1986, 2004).
Bruner (1990) writes:
…by virtue of participation in culture, meaning is rendered public and shared. Our cul-
turally adapted way of life depends upon shared meanings and shared concepts and depends
as well upon shared modes of discourse for negotiating differences in meaning and inter-
pretation. (p. 12–13)
Howard (1991) agrees and suggests that narrative is a way of knowing within the
context of culture and cross-cultural society. Culture can be seen as communal
consensus regarding a system of meaning that informs the way individuals within
groups make sense of lived experience. “Thus, a culture can be thought of as a
community of individuals who see the world in a particular manner—who share
particular interpretations as central to the meaning of their lives and actions”
(p. 190). Such meanings may fall into the domains of science, religion, politics,
morality, and others. Furthermore, individuals may participate in any number of
subcultures that make up a larger social framework and may take on a variety of
roles within these subcultures. It is also possible for there to be conflicting messages
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that are delivered by the subcultures to which one belongs. All these factors con-
tribute to the way in which people make meaning of their experience in the world.
This is particularly important in the context of social work practice as we attend
to the ways in which differences between our clients and us impact our under-
standing of their experience. We must always maintain a curiosity that wonders
how the world, or life, looks and feels from the perspective of the client. This is
always shaped by the many aspects of diversity that inform our experience: race,
ethnicity, gender, age, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, ability, family
structure, social history, etc.
Saleeby (1994) details the significance of attending to the intersection of the
meaning systems of the client, the worker, and the culture in which they are
embedded. This perspective takes seriously the impact of the social and political
environment, and can provide a vehicle for the client and worker to name and
challenge structures that may oppress the client as well as the community. This is
particularly important when considering issues of diagnosis and the stigma that, for
so many, is attached to the idea of mental illness.
Building on the work of Bruner (1986), Josselson (1995) suggests that Bruner
has brought legitimacy to the study of narrative as a means of understanding human
knowing. This narrative perspective gives a privileged place to the human expe-
rience of the observer or teller who is embedded in the matrix of society and
culture. Josselson writes: “Narratives are not records of facts, of how things were,
but of a meaning-making system that makes sense out of the chaotic mass of
perceptions and experiences of a life” (1995, p. 33). This perspective is essential
when we consider the nature of diagnosis. Particularly compared to the exercise of
diagnosing according to the fixed criteria of the DSM, the narrative perspective
draws our attention to the lived experience of the individual in the context of society
and culture, and seeks to understand the meaning of that experience on these
multiple levels.
The Impact of Culture and Dimensions of Diversity:
A Narrative Tapestry
As we consider social work practice with the mentally ill, these insights compel us
to reflect further on the multiple cultures and subcultures to which our clients
belong. We must ask ourselves what the multi-layered cultural and social system
reflects to the client about the meaning of mental illness and of being mentally ill.
Even before receiving a diagnosis, the client has been raised and immersed in a
particular cultural milieu and has absorbed its outlook. Following a diagnosis, the
client may well find him or herself to be the object of the culture’s narrative about
mental illness and the mentally ill. Clients are likely to internalize these messages as
they strive to make sense of their experience and to reconfigure their sense of self
and the narrative of their past and anticipated future in light of a mental illness. This
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interaction between the individual and the social environment is the birthplace of
stigma, both externalized stigma projected by others and internalized stigma
absorbed into the person’s sense of self.
We have noted that the nature of narrative development is recursive. That is to
say, individual and communal narratives shape, challenge, and reinforce each other.
We are influenced by the dominant narratives of the cultures in which we are
immersed. We, in turn, to a greater or lesser extent impact the narratives of our
culture(s). This may occur in spheres ranging from the closest circle of family and
friends, to the broadest social and cultural arenas within which we live. Those who
are marginalized and oppressed, however, may experience severe barriers to their
ability to influence the narrative of the wider culture, particularly with respect to an
experience like mental illness. This may be true, for example, of the homeless,
those who do not share the language of the dominant culture, and the poor, as well
as racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities. These individuals—who, because of their
marginalized status, often feel invisible and unheard—may well find this is only
exacerbated by a diagnosis of mental illness.
As was discussed with respect to the work of Bruner (1986, 2004), we frame our
experience in the language and constructs that are available to us. In other words,
the social and cultural vocabularies that we have learned both shape our under-
standing of our experience and provide the parameters within which we can
communicate about it. A clear example of this phenomenon is found in the cultural
concepts of distress discussed in the DSM–5 (American Psychiatric Association
2013). For example, the experience of ataque de nervios (an attack of nerves) is
encountered among many Latino clients as a culturally understood if upsetting
manifestation of anxiety and distress. Similarly, ghost sickness may be manifested
by members of some Native American communities as a consequence of the work
of witches or other evil powers. Within their cultural contexts, these conditions
have a significance that would be understood differently (or not at all) by those
outside the culture.
Examples of culture-based understandings of mental illness and mental distress
abound. In Quechua-speaking rural communities in southern Peru, for example,
mental illness, or what is referred to as “madness,” is considered a social and family
phenomenon that is manifested in a disturbance of behavior around food and eating.
Here, where the sharing of food has deep relational significance for the family, a
disruption in the ability to partake in the meal is a key sign of mental illness.
Similarly, the act of feeding and the provision of food is viewed as an essential
aspect of care for the person who is mentally ill (Orr 2013). Additionally, culture
has a great bearing on the process of many individuals in their struggle to accept a
mental health diagnosis. Culture may serve both as a facilitator and as a barrier to
this kind of acceptance (Mizock and Russinova 2013; Sosulski et al. 2010).
In order to work ethically with our clients and to connect empathically with their
experience, social workers must always reflect on the meaning of mental illness in
cultural context. This requires having a familiarity with the kinds of symptoms or
forms of emotional expression that are endorsed and those that are pathologized in a
given cultural and social situation. This distinction influences both the experience of
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the client who internalizes such messages and the way in which the environment
responds to the individual.
For example, consider how a phenomenon such as grief is viewed in your
culture. Following the death of a loved one, what is considered an “appropriate”
amount of time to grieve? What are the common ways that grief is expressed in
your culture? How do others respond to those who are grieving? At what point
would a person’s grief come to be viewed as “dysfunctional” or problematic? All of
these questions serve to reflect the notion that grief is both a personal and a social/
cultural experience. The meaning of grief is conveyed to us through a social and
cultural narrative that helps us make sense of that experience. When an individual’s
experience or manifestation of grief falls outside of this culturally endorsed nar-
rative, we come to think of this as a “problem”—something that deviates from what
is acceptable and thus needs to be addressed.
Members of the mental health community, including social workers, have a
unique voice in shaping the social narrative around issues of mental illness and
psychopathology. Consider, for example, the origins of the term hysteria. The word
hysteria comes from the ancient Greek term for womb or uterus. This reflected the
Greek notion that symptoms of hysteria were caused by a medical issue in the
uterus. Thus, hysteria was an illness experienced exclusively by women. Over time,
this medical connotation gave way to a more psychological understanding of
hysteria as a neurotic disorder marked by symptoms of anxiety with somatic
manifestations such as fainting and paralysis (Freud and Breuer 1985/2004). It was
continued to be viewed, however, as a condition related to the uterus, and thus,
diagnosed only in women. In social and cultural narrative, the term has come to
take on a negative connotation that led to its use as a gender-biased form of
dismissal or marginalization.
Currently, the debate about cultural narratives of mental illness continues. With
the publication of the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association 2013), there has been much
discussion of the broader significance of changes to a manual that is already a
product of a social and cultural discourse about mental illness. Horwitz and
Wakefield (2007), for example, have posed the challenging question of whether or
not the psychiatric establishment has come to pathologize the experience of ordinary
sadness. If this is so, is it a reflection of a culture that has grown increasingly
intolerant of the experience of emotional discomfort or of a medical and pharma-
ceutical industry that is invested in classifying the experience as a disorder for which
they can provide costly treatment? In other words, if you are experiencing troubling
feelings in your mind and body, and there is a medicine that might allow you not to
have to feel those feelings, does this mean you have a disorder? Given what is known
about the recursive nature of narrative development, the great likelihood that it is
both and that each of these factors serves to reinforce the other.
All of this has clear implications for our understanding of the nature and
experience of mental illness as well as for the work of assessment and diagnosis in
which we engage as social workers. Social workers are continually “walking the
tightrope” between diagnostic and environmental approaches to an understanding
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of mental illness (Probst 2013). It is imperative for us, at all times, to maintain an
awareness of the socially constructed nature of the concept of mental illness—a
concept that simultaneously shapes both the ways in which we receive the expe-
rience of our clients and our understanding of mental illness itself. Narrative theory
is well suited to this approach (Fisher and Freshwater 2014). A narrative per-
spective must ask not only, “Is my client mentally ill” or “With which mental
illness should be client be diagnosed” but “What is my client’s understanding, both
of the nature of their experience, and the meaning of this for their identity and sense
of self?” This is a question to which we now turn our attention.
Diagnosis and the Self: Do I Have a Mental Illness? Or Am
I Mentally Ill?
Since narrative both emerges from and continually shapes our appraisal of the
meaning of our experience, it has an inevitable relationship to our sense of self and
identity. The way in which we tell the story of our life gives dimension to our sense
of self, the world, and our self in the world. When considering the nature of mental
illness then, the question that arises for those struggling with such conditions is,
“Do I have a mental illness? Or am I mentally ill?” As with other chronic and
serious conditions affecting the health of our clients (e.g. cancer), individuals with
mental illness come to think of their illness and themselves within the framework
that society and culture sets for them (Bruner 1991, 2004). This shapes the range of
possible versions or meanings available to them and may be quite limiting. It may
also mean that these individuals struggle greatly to maintain a sense of self that is
broader than the illness with which they live. For many, this entails a process of
mourning the loss of the life that they might have imagined for themselves—not
necessarily a life marked by any particularly grand accomplishments, but one free
of the burdens that a mental illness may impose.
Narrative Practice with Diverse Populations
Social work practice is about encounter—which means encounter with the other
(Ploesser and Mecherill 2011). This may be construed, of course in many ways,
inasmuch as there are perhaps countless ways of being other. Narrative approaches
to practice perhaps pay particular attention to this kind of encounter with the other.
Our engagement with clients almost inevitably stands at the intersection of a variety
of forms of otherness, since the likelihood of encountering a client who is “like me”
in every readily identifiable way is more than remote (and even then there is still
more otherness to discover!).
Whether we are focusing on difference in gender, race, ethnicity, sexual identity
or preference, religious belief, socioeconomic status, family structure, physical or
intellectual ability, or even mental health, we are continually interacting with clients
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whose otherness may be more or less apparent to us. As often is the case in social
work practice, the ways in which a client appears different may be more apparent to
us than the ways in which we are similar. This may be particularly true when we
work with clients who are marginalized or oppressed. When intersectionality, the
compounding effects of the interaction of multiple categories of marginalization or
oppression, is at play, our sense of the client’s difference may be even greater
(Murphy et al. 2009).
Of course, difference or otherness is likely to be a factor not only for us, but for
the client as well. Relying on perceptions of our difference from them, clients may
question our ability really to hear and understand the story of their experience.
Together, clients and social workers may be drawn into the sometimes tempting
fantasy that, in order to understand each other, we must be “similar” is some sort of
apparent way. This, of course, is deceiving and dividing, and can undermine the
development of a productive therapeutic alliance. In fact, both similarity and dif-
ference from our clients contain the possibility of many layers of meaning. What is
more essential is our ability to convey an openness to the other in the experience of
their otherness and to demonstrate to our clients the kind of curiosity that was
discussed above.
Our encounter with otherness in the social worker/client relationship is an
instance of the intersection of unique narrative worlds. For this reason, work with
two clients will never be quite the same, even if we do grow through the process of
accumulating knowledge as we become more familiar with some of the shared
aspects of experience. Like our clients, we come to this work with our own nar-
ratives—our stories of ourselves, the world, and ourselves in the world. At its
deepest level, our ability to work with our clients in all the many aspects of our
mutual diversity is not dependent on the acquisition of the “facts and figures” about
this or that client group. It is not about what I have learned about a “category” of
person, though this kind of information can be somewhat helpful in a general way.
Rather, it depends on our ability to be open to the client and the worlds of human
experience, understanding, and even misunderstanding they (and we) bring into the
consulting room. It depends on our ability to take seriously on a fundamental level
their experience as they experience it, and to make ourselves available with
whatever knowledge and skill we have so that together we can help the client come
to a deeper, richer, and more life-giving sense of self. While it does not guarantee
success with every client in every situation, it can go a long way to helping us
bridge those gaps that we imagine keep us so far apart.
Conclusions
Just as Crossley (2000, 2003) suggested that the experience of trauma reveals the
profound orderliness that we have come to expect from life, so too the diagnosis
and experience of a mental illness calls into question profoundly important, but
commonly taken for granted dimensions of our day-to-day existence. These include
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the clarity of mind and stability of emotion that we associate with mental health.
Similarly, the ability to study or work, to organize the business of daily life, and to
experience mental and emotional leisure, and even the opportunity to participate in
stable and reciprocal relationships may all be adversely impacted by mental illness.
As social workers, we must be attentive to the possible impact of all of this on
the client’s narrative of the self. “Do I have a mental illness, or am I mentally ill?” It
is essential to note that some of these narratives, based solely in psychiatric con-
ceptualizations of pathology, may serve to oppress and obscure rather than to
liberate and clarify. Some clients may feel that diagnoses have been used to mar-
ginalize and blame them, or to dismiss their experience. I still recall the first time I
heard a clinician, frustrated by the challenging and erratic moods and behaviors of a
client, say dismissively, “She’s just a borderline!” I recall, too, a most helpful
supervisor who modeled a stance of compassion when she said, “I wonder what
terrible things she has experienced in life that taught her that this is what she needs
to do in order to have her needs met?” In all the years since that moment, the voice
of that supervisor has reminded me to seek to understand the experience of the
client—no matter how difficult that experience may be.
As social workers working to achieve justice with and for our clients, (Wakefield
2013) one of our responsibilities may be to help clients break open and challenge
the dominant and dominating narratives that have come to shape their sense of
identity—to call into question the cultural “givens” and facilitate a re-storying of
clients’ experience in a way that is nuanced, life affirming, and liberating. This is
not to deny the problematic and disruptive aspects or impact of mental illness.
Rather, it is to support mentally ill persons in developing a sense of self that is
constituted by more than their mental illness. This is something that narrative is
uniquely suited to do.
Application to the Case of Ray
How then, can we apply this narrative approach to the case of Ray? In this section,
we will consider a number of aspects of Ray’s experience and the ways in which
they might impact his narrative of his life and experience. This kind of under-
standing is essential if one wishes to work with such a client from a narrative
perspective.
First, it may be noted that Ray is similar to a great number of men who may be
compelled at some point to present for treatment. I say “compelled” here, because
often such clients will say that they might not have sought out treatment for them-
selves if the pain they were experiencing and the circumstances they were enduring
had not made the need for help clear to them. So often, these men have been
socialized to believe that strength and masculinity require emotional endurance and
that they should be able to tolerate without difficulty whatever degree of adversity
life may throw their way. For such men (and some women as well, of course),
reaching out for help represents some form of weakness. Alternatively, some may
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feel that requests for support should be confined to a specific group of people who
may share a similar experience. (E.g. “A cop should only talk to a cop; a fireman
should only talk to a fireman. No one else will understand.”) It is important to
acknowledge that both of these perspectives are, in fact, narratives. They are the kind
of narratives that can exercise tremendous emotional authority in the lives of indi-
viduals and may make it difficult for some to receive the help they need.
Nonetheless, Ray does find himself in treatment. The distress he is experiencing
in his daily living has prompted him to seek out some assistance. There are a
number of aspects of Ray’s story to which we might attend from a narrative
perspective. Ray has a meaningful relationship to his Catholic identity. This has
impacted his story in a number of ways. He is a man who believes that loyalty and
trust are qualities of great importance in a person. (Note that although this may not
seem like a “narrative,” it constitutes part of the “story” that Ray tells himself about
what it means to be a good person in the world. This is the narrative way of framing
Ray’s outlook.)
Ray believes that one must never “rat out” another person. This is part of the
conflict that he has with his girlfriend, Cecilia. He feels that she has betrayed him to
the priest from whom they sought counseling as a couple (something Ray was
reluctant to do and agreed to only because he thought it meant they were going to
work things out) by disclosing personal details and then “turning on him”. It is also
part of his conflict in disclosing the abuse he sustained by a priest when he was a boy.
One might consider that this reluctance may also be connected to the kind of nar-
rative about male strength that was discussed above. Ray should be strong enough
not to be impacted by these events that, however painful, took place long ago.
Ray’s narrative as an Irish Catholic has also informed his sense of guilt and the
meaning guilt has for him. Ray continues to feel guilt over the three abortions
Cecilia had at his request. Here, there is evidence of conflicting narratives. One lies
at the heart of his guilt over the abortions. Another lies at the heart of his belief that
they were necessary at the time. It is not uncommon to encounter clients who are
struggling with two or more competing narratives in treatment. And it is often
powerful and therapeutic to be able to “hear” or pick out those narratives and bring
those competing claims to light for further exploration and resolution.
Ray’s understanding of guilt has also impacted his feelings about not having
been able to save a fourth child from a burning building. In this case, the guilt
narrative leads Ray to highlight in his consciousness the loss of one child while
subjugating or downplaying his rescue of three others. This was reinforced by the
events of 9/11 that led to a shift in his narrative about the meaning of being a police
officer. Where he once focused on the satisfaction he derived from “doing some
good”, he now feels that, “All I ever see are the worst things about people…”. To
make matters worse, in light of recent events, Ray’s gun has been taken away and
he has been reassigned to a post where he feels that all he can do is wait and watch
while bad things happen—a passive stance that further confirms this shift in his
narrative.
We may notice that there are ways in which both narratives contain aspects of
“truth”, but that many circumstances of life lead us to attend selectively to some
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details more than others. In narratively base treatment, we work with clients to
broaden these filters in order to help them see a broader (and hopefully more
adaptive and healthy) array of narrative elements that are “also true” and just as true
as the more limiting stories they have been telling themselves.
Another significant narrative that has shaped Ray’s experience involves the story
of himself as different from others (particularly peers), and as needing to defend
himself. As a boy of eight or nine, Ray became aware of himself as smaller than and
different in appearance from his neighborhood peers. It is also his understanding
that these factors contributed to the bullying he experienced. All of this led to the
development of his narrative that it is important for him to be tougher and stronger.
While this story or perspective may have served some adaptive purpose (though
there certainly might have been other ways to manage the situation) in helping Ray
deal with neighborhood bullies, it is also a narrative that has led to more significant
troubles in his life. Ray has found himself getting into bar fights over perceived
offenses. It has even led to some physical violence with Cecilia. Here again, we
notice a conflict between two competing narratives. On the one hand, Ray has a
story that tells of the importance of being tough and standing up for yourself—a
story in which fighting becomes a means of self-expression, a language of sorts. On
the other hand, Ray also has a story of growing up in a loving and peaceful
household and of the prohibition against violence toward women. When these two
stories come into conflict, Ray knew he needed help because “for the first time this
violence had cost him something that really mattered…”
Powerfully intermingled with all of this is Ray’s narrative as a survivor of sexual
abuse at the hands of a priest when he was a child. From this experience emerge
numerous narrative threads that have become so twisted as to form a knot that Ray
has struggled mightily to cope with if not undo. Like that of so many survivors of
abuse, Ray’s narrative has been shrouded in secrecy born of shame. Like so many
others he asks himself, “Why me?” “Was there something I did to bring this on?
“Was there something I did to encourage it?” Given what we already know about
Ray, it becomes apparent that this experience of great pain stands in conflict with
some of the dominant narrative themes we have already touched on—themes of
trust and betrayal of trust, the theme of being singled out or targeted for abuse, and
the theme of guilt, this time over other victims, he feels he might have saved if he
had come forward earlier.
Ray’s story is a perfect example of the way in which, in narratively informed
treatment, the multiple layers of story and meaning are interwoven to form a
complex tapestry. For this reason, as was discussed, narrative treatment relies on
our ability to listen carefully in a particular kind of way—to listen for the presence
of stories and of systems of meaning. We listen for the ways in which those stories
are challenged and reinforced, and for the ways in which our clients attend,
unintentionally or unknowingly perhaps, to some aspects of the story while
ignoring or downplaying others. We listen with great curiosity, wondering where
the narrative unfolding will take us, and how the story may play out as we
encourage our client to imagine and explore new plot lines that lead to new
capacities and a new sense of self.
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In this context of a trusting therapeutic relationship, we have the opportunity to
play with and stretch the stories that clients tell themselves and tell us. With some
prompting and support, the narrative that emerges from this kind of re-storying can
be deeply rich even if is marked by great pain. In the telling and crafting of the
story, in the powerful exchange that occurs when the story is not only told but
heard, not only shared but received, we open up the possibility of discovering
something greater than ourselves. In this, we find the possibility of crafting a
narrative that takes us simultaneously beyond and deeper to understand ourselves
more fully. That is narrative in practice.
Practical Exercises
Consider journaling about your own narrative with respect to some of these
questions. You might wish to discuss your thoughts with someone you trust.
1. What are the dominant aspects of your narrative about yourself, the key aspects
of the way you understand yourself?
2. Who and what factors have been most formative in the shaping of your own
narrative of the person you are? Consider things like ethnicity, family structure,
family expectations, and messages about you and your place in the world,
gender, sexuality, and spirituality.
3. What has been your narrative of yourself as a social worker and helping pro-
fessional? What personal experiences have led you into this profession? What is
the story you are telling yourself about who you will be as a social worker, the
kind of work that you will do, and the impact you will have on your clients?
4. Are there stories or narratives that you find particularly intriguing or compel-
ling? What are the kinds of narratives you most wish to hear (or at least think
you will)? Are there narratives that are (or that you imagine will be) too painful
or frightening to hear?
5. Are you aware of any narratives that you have inherited from our culture,
family, environment, that may be limiting to you, your clients, or your ability to
be helpful to them?
Try some of these prompts and see what they bring up in you and how you
respond to them:
(a) I think of myself as a person who…
(b) Those who know me well would say that I…
(c) I find it most difficult when…
(d) I am at my best when…
(e) The thing about myself I find most difficult to embrace is…
6. What did you learn from your culture, environment, or the media as you grew
up about the mentally ill?
7. How do you understand the causes of mental illness? What thoughts, feelings,
and fantasies do you have about those who suffer from mental illness?
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8. If you have had the opportunity to work with clients, think back to your
encounters and try “listening” from the vantage point of narrative. (You can, of
course, practice this in your sessions going forward as well.) What stories do
you hear the client telling about themselves and their experience of the world?
Have those stories been helpful or unhelpful to them—or somewhere in
between? How might a narrative approach impact the way you work with your
client? (This can be done as an in-class exercise in pairs or small groups.)
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